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Abstract
This paper identifies gender beliefs in a public goods game and studies their impact on cooperation. On average, the
beliefs of men, but not those of women, depend significantly on the group gender composition, with men expecting
groups to be more cooperative when more females are present in the group. Gender beliefs of women are not absent,
however, but show more variance than those of men. The contributions to the public good are driven by gender
beliefs, and after controlling for them, contributions do not depend on the gender group composition directly.
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1. Introduction 
 
Existing experimental studies offer conflicting insights about the impact of group gender 
composition on cooperation in public goods games. Women are sometimes identified as more 
cooperative than men (Novell and Tinkler 1994, Sell 1997), but the gender differences are far 
from systematic (Ledyard 1995, Croson and Gneezy, 2009, Anderson et al. 2011). We propose 
that these findings can be explained by accounting for the role of gender beliefs. We measure 
them explicitly in our experiments, and link to the subject’s contributions. 
 Gender beliefs can be defined as different interpretations and expectations concerning the 
personality traits (how women and men are) and behavior (how women and men behave) of men 
and women. Moreover, gender beliefs are not only descriptive, but also prescriptive, stating how 
women and men should be and should behave (Heilman 2001). 
In the public goods game experiments, the modal type of behavior is conditional 
cooperation, where one’s own contribution increases in the (expected) contribution of others 
(Keser and van Winden 2000, Fischbacher et al. 2001). Gender beliefs would significantly affect 
public goods contributions if groups of some gender compositions are believed to be more 
cooperative than others. 
The characteristics of gender beliefs concerning men and women can be summarized 
around achievement-oriented traits for men — agentic traits — and service-oriented traits for 
women — communal traits (Wood and Eagly 2012). This leads to the prescriptive gender belief 
concerning women "that women should be nurturing and service-oriented (communal), but not 
tough and achievement-oriented (agentic)" (Heilman 2001, p. 667). 
Both descriptive and prescriptive dimensions of gender beliefs contribute to individual 
self-definitions as masculine or feminine, and operate at the interpersonal level "defining the 
behaviors that are appropriate to various social contexts, influencing individuals' expectations for 
and interpretations of others' behavior, and guiding the manner in which people interact with 
members of their own and the other gender" (Whitley and Ægisdóttir 2000, p. 962). 
 Empirical studies have identified that men hold stronger gender beliefs than women 
(Baber and Jenkins Tucker 2006, Smiler and Gelman 2008). This gender difference in gender 
beliefs can be explained by social dominance theory and expectation states theory, which argue 
that because men tend to have a higher socio-economic status than women, they have a stake in 
preserving that advantaged position and traditional stereotypes about gender roles supporting 
their status (Whitley and Ægisdóttir 2000, Ridgeway, 2001, Gerber 2009).  
Some previous experimental studies addressed gender beliefs indirectly. Women have 
been identified as considered more cooperative (Aguiar et al. 2009, List 2006, Oberholzer-Gee et 
al. 2010, Gabardine and Sonic 2009). And, gender beliefs were found asymmetric, with men 
holding stronger beliefs than women (Boschini et al. 2012, Dufwenberg and Muren 2006).  
In this paper we measure gender beliefs directly, and use them to explain behavior of 
participants in a public goods game. 
 
2. Experimental design and hypotheses 
 
We implement a three-person public goods game with the payoff function given by 
	ሺݔ, ܻሻ ൌ ͳͷ െ ݔ ൅ Ͳ.͸ሺݔ ൅ ܻሻ, where x denotes the subject’s contribution, and Y is the 
contribution of the other two group members.  
In the experiment, the groups are composed randomly, and subjects know that the group 
gender composition will be announced at the end of the experiment. Subjects submit their 
contributions to the public good for each possible gender group composition. After the 
experiment, the realized group gender composition determines the payoff-relevant decision. 
Subjects also report their beliefs about the joint contribution of the other two subjects for each 
possible group composition: for the case if matched to two women (WW), two men (MM), or one 
woman and one man (WM). Gächter and Renner (2010) discuss the tradeoff involved in 
incentivizing beliefs, and observe that incentivized beliefs are somewhat more precise than stated 
beliefs, but affect contributions to the public good. As it is our intention to link the reported 
beliefs to the contributions, we choose the method results in behavior most resembling the case 
when no beliefs are elicited (see Gächter and Renner 2010). Consequently, we do not incentivize 
the beliefs reported by the subjects. 
 Our subjects, 80 students (31 women, and 49 men) of programs in economics and business 
at Radboud University, the Netherlands participate in cca 10 minutes short pen-and-paper 
experiment. After the experiment, 10 randomly selected participants are paid in anonymity for 
their decisions, on average 7.10 Euro. 
 
We test the following hypotheses: 
 
Gender beliefs and cooperation: Women are believed to be more cooperative. Consequently, (i) 
subjects’ reported beliefs about the joint contribution of others in the public goods game increase 
with the number of women in the group; (ii) the contribution of an individual to the one-shot 
public good increases with the number of women in the group. 
 
Gender differences in gender beliefs: Men hold stronger gender beliefs than women.  
Consequently, subjects’ beliefs about the joint contribution of others in the public goods game 
increase with the number of women in the group more for men than for women.  
 
 
3. Results and discussion 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the reported gender beliefs and contributions of women and men in 
the experiment, by presenting how these beliefs depend on the gender of the other two group 
members. On average, women do not change their belief about contributions of others with the 
group composition, while men belief that the contributions will be higher when the number of 
women in the group is higher. Men and women hold similar beliefs about contributions in a 
group with two other women, but men are less optimistic than women about contributions in a 
group with other two men.  
We construct an individual measure of gender beliefs by subtracting the beliefs about 
contributions in the MM scenario from those in the FF scenario. The average difference is 
negative for women and positive for men (equal to -0.23 and 4.23, respectively). This gender 
difference in gender beliefs is significant (Mann-Whitney U test, p=0,054), albeit marginally. 
Gender beliefs are expressed stronger by men. According to their beliefs, women are more 
cooperative. 
Investigation of the individual gender beliefs reveals, however, that gender beliefs of 
women are possibly not weaker, but instead show more variation than those of men (see Table 1). 
A majority of men (59%) expresses the belief that contributions increase with the number of 
women, with the remaining 41% split equally between expecting decreasing, constant, or 
nonmonotonous contributions. Among women, beliefs are less uniform, with 42% of women 
expecting increasing contributions with more women while 35% expecting exactly the opposite 
pattern of decreasing contributions. On average, female beliefs therefore seem not to condition on 
the gender group composition. 
 
 
Figure 1. Contributions and gender beliefs by a subject (man or woman), depending on the 
gender group composition: MM=two men, WM=one woman and one men, WW=two women. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Gender beliefs categories. 
            
  
Gender beliefs about contribution of others depending 
on number of other women in the group   
  increasing decreasing constant nonmotonous N 
Women 42% 35% 3% 19% 31 
Men 59% 14% 14% 12% 49 
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 We explain public good contributions by gender beliefs using OLS regression, accounting 
for individual effects, see Table 2. Model 1 explains subjects’ contributions by the number of 
other women in the group, while controlling for the gender of the contributing subject. The fit of 
the model is poor, but the gender group composition variable is significant, with contributions 
increasing with the number of other women in the group. Including the gender beliefs in model 2 
improves the explanatory power of the model, and this variable also explains contributions. 
Subjects behave as conditional cooperators. The higher the expected contribution of others, as 
identified by the subject’s gender beliefs, the higher is the subject’s contribution.  
Finally, when including both gender beliefs and gender group composition in model 3, we 
find that the gender beliefs predict contributions, and the impact of the group gender composition 
is exerted via these gender beliefs. We do not find evidence for chivalry or other motivations that 
are purely driven by the gender group composition. The differences in contributions across 
gender seem to be explained by the variations in gender beliefs across men and women, and after 
controlling for beliefs, are not affected anymore purely by the group gender composition.  
 
 
Table 2. OLS regression explaining contributions  in the public goods game (standard 
errors in parentheses). 
 
  
*** coefficient significant at p<0.001, ** coefficient significant at p<0.01. 
 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
To summarize, we observe the following. First, beliefs of subjects about contributions of others 
are gendered, conditioning on the gender group composition. Second, the gender beliefs of men 
are more uniform, and women are expected to be more cooperative according to them. The 
expectations of women are on average independent of gender. However, at an individual level, 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Gender (1=female, 0=male) 0,148 -0,359 -0,331
(0,828) (0,679) (0,682)
Belief about contribution of the others 0,213*** 0,201***
(0,030) (0,031)
# of other females in the group (0, 1, or 2) 0,538** 0,278
(0,177) (0,180)
Constant 3,605*** 1,935*** 1,776***
(0,545) (0,523) (0,536)
Individual effects included yes yes yes
Rsquare overall 0,0122 0,2777 0,2756
N 240 240 240
beliefs of women are also gendered, but show more variance than those of men. Third, regression 
analysis shows that the group gender composition affects contributions via the channel of 
gendered beliefs, and when controlling for beliefs, we find no direct effect of the group gender 
composition. 
Our findings explain prior observations that only men hold gender beliefs. Their effect is 
easier to identify because they are more uniform. In strategic environments, beliefs affect 
behavior, and differences in behavior attributed to the preferences might stem from belief 
differences across gender. This might explain why gender differences in behavior have been 
identified in some experiments in the past, but not in others.  
More broadly, accounting for gender beliefs might help to explain gender differences in 
behavior, and such phenomena as gender wage gap and the performance of diversified boards. 
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